We report on a series of behavioral experiments in social networks in which human subjects continuously choose to play either a dominant role (called a King) or a submissive one (called a Pawn). Kings receive a higher payoff rate, but only if all their network neighbors are Pawns, and thus the maximum social welfare states correspond to maximum independent sets. We document that fairness is of vital importance in driving interactions between players. First, we find that payoff disparities between network neighbors gives rise to conflict, and the specifics depend on the network topology. However, allowing Kings to offer "tips" or side payments to their neighbors substantially reduces conflict, and consistently increases social welfare; although equilibrium theory predicts no exchanges of tips, we see considerable tipping in practice. Finally, we observe that tip reductions are considerably less frequent than tip increases, and lead to increased conflict. We describe these and a broad set of related findings.
Introduction
Reporting on a series of behavioral experiments, we demonstrate the central importance of fairness and conflict in interactions between players which entail exclusively financial consequences. The experiments were held in a single session with 36 human subjects, each controlling the state of a single node in an exogenously imposed social network. In our first set of experiments, each subject could choose to be a King or a Pawn. A King is paid at a higher rate (twice as much as a Pawn), but only if no network neighbor is in conflict with him or her by also having chosen to be a King; a King in conflict receives no payments. Players can asynchronously change their state at any time. Since only one of any two neighbors can be a King for either to be paid, such a configuration is inherently "unfair", giving rise to considerable tensions between pure self-interest and fairness considerations. Our second set of experiments thus involved an additional element: Kings that had no conflicts were able to designate a tip (or side payment) which was equally divided among their Pawn neighbors.
Looking at our experiments through a game-theoretic lens suggests no difference between our two settings: there should be no tip exchanges in equilibrium. Our behavioral results firmly suggest otherwise: we document numerous qualitative and quantitative differences between the first (no tips) and the second (with tips) settings. One of the most notable observations is that social welfare is uniformly higher when tips are allowed. This result is surprising even if we take for granted tip exchanges (in fact, positive tip levels are very persistent in the experiments), since these are pure internal transfers of wealth.
We argue that (the lack of) perceived fairness is primarily responsible for the observed differences between the two experimental settings: inequality in payoffs creates considerable conflict in the first setting, and tips ameliorate conflict by bridging the payoff gaps in the second setting. This finding is robust to the network topology and has broad implications, including the suggestion that reducing income inequality may actually raise social welfare overall.
A well-known theory in macroeconomics suggests that wages are resistant to reduction, since people view reductions in their wages as inherently unfair even if their real value is preserved (Akerlof and Shiller 2009) . Roughly mapping tips in our setting to wages, we find behavioral evidence for this "downward rigidity". Specifically, we observe that for similar average tip levels, a tip reduction resulted in considerably more conflict. Furthermore, we find that the amount of conflict in response to tip reductions actually rises with average tip pay rate-higher earners appear to respond more strongly to pay cuts.
The experiments described here are part of a broader and ongoing program of behavioral experiments in strategic and economic interaction on social networks conducted at Penn (Kearns, Suri, and Montfort 2006; Judd and Kearns 2008; Kearns et al. 2009) , and are an effort to apply the methods of behavioral game theory (Camerer 2003) to the study of social networks.
Related Literature
The subject of fairness in human interactions has a very long history. Sociologists and social psychologists view it as central to many social phenomena, and have well-developed theories of fair exchange and reciprocity (exchange/equity theory) (Brown 1986) , although a true appreciation of equity of exchanges needs to consider long term "accounting" and the subjective evaluation of fairness.
While there is considerable economic literature on fairness, it has yet to make it into the mainstream. According to Albert Rees (1993) , "The factors involved in setting wages and salaries in the real world seemed to be very different from those specified in the neoclassical theory. The one factor that seemed to be of overwhelming importance in all these situations was fairness." Akerlof and Yellen develop a hypothesis of wage effort based on fairness considerations (1990) which allows them to offer an explanation of unemployment and supports the general observation that wages tend to be downwardly rigid (Akerlof and Shiller 2009 ). Rabin (1993) offers a theory that incorporates fairness into more traditional game theoretic models of pairwise interactions. The economic experiments of Fehr and Gächter (2000) show that people frequently punish nonaltruistic behavior and derive pleasure from doing so.
Experimental Design Payment Mechanisms
In our experiments players were mapped to nodes on exogenously specified networks. A conflict-free configuration of Kings forms an independent set. Since Kings are paid only when all their neighbors are Pawns, social welfare is maximized when Kings form a maximum independent set. In general, computing such a maximum independent set is NP-Hard, but small instances of such problems can often be successfully solved by human subjects (Kearns, Suri, and Montfort 2006) .
We ran two variants of this basic King-Pawn scenario. The first was precisely as described above. In the second, we additionally allowed players to offer tips to each other. Tips are payable only while a King is non-conflicting (i.e., he is a King and all of his neighbors are Pawns), and when payable they are divided equally among neighbors. Tip offer values were an amount between 0 and 100% of a King's pay rate, but were restricted to quantum steps of 10% (i.e., 10 cents/min). We call this second scenario the "tips" setting, in contrast to the former, which we call the "no-tips" setting.
A natural question to ask is whether allowing players to exchange tips is at all consequential according to traditional game theory. Let us thus observe that in the tips setting, non-conflicting Kings should never offer tips at Nash equilibrium. Even though this observation is made with respect to a static setting, it also holds in a repeated game setting if we restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria, so long as the repeated game has a finite number of steps. Since the experiments involve a known time limit and our clock has a Figure 1 : A screenshot of a player's GUI for the tips scenario. The central node represents the player using the GUI. The numbers displayed near the circles indicate tip offers. The slider designates a choice for the tip offer. The buttons at the bottom of the screen allow a player to choose to be a king or a pawn. In the no-tips setting all allusions to tips (including the slide bar and tip amounts near the nodes) are removed.
finite granularity, they are essentially finite-period repeated games. A key consequence of this is that the sets of equilibria are identical in the tips and no-tips settings. As such, traditional game theory would classify the two settings as strategically identical. Behaviorally, however, we shall see that the two settings exhibit many substantial differences.
Human Subject Methodology
All experiments were held in a single session lasting multiple hours with 36 University of Pennsylvania students as participants. We ran two sets of 19 experiments, one set for the no-tips and another for the tips setting. Each experiment had a fixed network topology (described above), and subjects were randomly assigned to nodes. All experiments lasted exactly two minutes.
A screenshot of the tips GUI is shown in Figure 1 ; for the no-tips setting, the tip rate bar was simply absent. Each player was given only a local view of the network; that is, a player could see his neighbors and relationships between them, as well as their role and tip choices, but could not see relationships or actions of anyone else. All actions were asynchronous. Role changes or tip adjustments could be made at any time during the game.
The session was closely proctored and physical partitions were erected to ensure no communication between subjects. 
Network Topologies
In both the no-tips and the tips settings we ran three experiments each on six network topologies (Bipartite, Preferential Attachment Tree, Dense Preferential Attachment, Clique Chain, Rewired Chain, and Erdős-Rényi) and a single experiment on a Pairs topology. Visualizations of typical candidates from each topology class are provided in Figure 2 . If a specific topology is a class with a stochastic generative model (i.e., one of Bipartite, Preferential Attachment Tree or Dense Graph, Rewired Chain, and Erdős-Rényi Graph), we generated a different network in each of a set of three experiments on that topology, but used a matching set of graphs in the no-tips and tips settings.
In the Preferential Attachment (PA) Tree, each node that is added to the graph is connected to exactly one existing node. In the Dense PA topology, a new node is connected to three existing nodes. For Erdős-Rényi graphs, we set the probability p of an edge between two nodes to 0.15. Each of 102 edges in the Bipartite graphs paired players uniformly at random. Rewired Chain starts with a Clique Chain as a baseline and rerouts each intra-clique edge with probability 0.2. More detailed descriptions and motivation for these and similar generative models can be found in (Watts 2003) .
Main Results

Collective Wealth and Tipping
As observed above, game-theoretic solutions do not predict any difference arising from allowing players to exchange tips. Figures 3, 4 and 5, however, demonstrate a systematic improvement in average payoffs of players (i.e., social welfare) under the tips setting. The range of welfare impact of tips varies considerably, but is rather substantial for some networks.
In Figure 3 we report the relative social efficiencies (behaviorally realized social welfare as a proportion of the the- Figure 3: Achieved welfare (average payoff per player per minute) in the no-tips and tips settings. Networks marked by ** exhibited significant payoff improvement with P < 0.05, while those marked by *** experienced improvement significant with P < 0.01. oretically optimal social welfare) for the different network topologies (averaged over trials), under both the no-tips and tips settings. Clique Chain, Rewired Chain, and Erdős-Rényi networks exhibit the greatest payoff improvements under tips (around 15% of optimal welfare). The Pairs network -where there is no "network" per se but rather 18 separate one-on-one games -shows the least improvement, suggesting that the social welfare benefits of tips increase with network complexity. Payoff improvements were significant (P < 0.05) in 5 of 7 network architectures (shown in Figure 3) , and overall improvement in welfare was significant with P < 0.01. Figure 4 illustrates the absolute average rates of income for all 19 networks in each of the two settings. The shaded area below $0.50 is the zone where players are earning less than what a constant Pawn would earn. The PA trees stand out as being particularly wealthy in both settings; the A look at the aggregate dynamics ( Figure 5 ) offers some additional detail. First, welfare rises over time in both settings: players learn their "roles" as the experiment progresses, and, perhaps, find conflict relatively futile at the experiment's end. Second, average welfare improvement due to tips is persistent throughout the span of experiment.
Furthermore, we find that the use of tips, when they are allowed, is rather substantial, the predictions of game theory notwithstanding: tips accounted for 13% of all income in the tips setting. Figure 5 shows average tip rate offered by players over time (average taken over all tips experiments). The tip rate is initialized to zero, but jumps almost immediately after an experiment starts, and persists at around 20% for the bulk of the experiment. It falls off gradually between 70 and 100 seconds and then faster after the 100 second mark, but, even at the end of the experiments, average tip rate persists at around 10%, well above equilibrium level. In spite of this fall-off in tipping near the end of the game, the social efficiency continued to edge upwards. We found no significant correlation between tip rates and experiment index within the session, suggesting no long-term adaptation of tipping behavior. 
Conflict and Fairness
Thus far we have established the substantial use of tips when available, and their consistent improvement of social welfare. But what behavioral processes underly these phenomena? While traditional game theory cannot provide a satisfactory answer, here we propose and support the following hypothesis: Subjects used conflict -which reduces the wealth of all players involved -to express perceived unfairness or inequality. Tipping reduces unfairness and consequently reduces conflict, thereby raising the average payoffs of all players in the process.
We begin this analysis by contrasting quantitative measures of income inequality between the no-tips and tips scenarios. Consider first just the horizontal axis of Figure 7 , which measures average income disparity (defined as the average squared difference in payoffs between network neighbors). Since tip levels persist well above zero, and that money is being routed to other players, it is significant and unsurprising that income disparity falls when tipping is allowed. What is more interesting is that tipping appears to roughly equalize payoff asymmetries across networks, which were substantially more variable in the no-tips case. For example, PA Tree networks that had shown large income inequality in the no-tips setting are now much closer in that measure to other network types.
We found a significant correlation (0.49, P < 0.04) between income disparity under the no-tips setting and tips exchanged when they are allowed. Our interpretation is that the more a game is perceived as unfair, the greater the role that tips must play in bridging income gaps between players.
The role of tipping in reducing income inequality is only one part of our hypothesis. Additionally, we posit that conflict serves a similar purpose in expressing a perception of unfairness; thus, tips effectively replace or substitute for conflict when they bridge inequality gaps. To support the idea that tips substitute for conflict, we expect to see substantial reduction in conflict between players when tips are allowed. Figure 7 shows this on its vertical axis: the amount of conflict between players (specifically, the average proportion of the game that a player spent in conflict, with average taken over players and games) is systematically lower in the tips setting. Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish a clear relationship between income disparity and conflict.
We conjecture that what matters is perceived, rather than observed (or measured) unfairness, as suggested by equity theory (Brown 1986 ). In our experiments, the network position of a player may partially offset payoff disparity in the players' minds: it may seem fair that low degree nodes receive higher income due to their positional advantage. As further support that conflict communicates perceived unfairness, we looked at individual level correlations between the time that a player spends in conflict that he initiates and ultimately terminates, and that player's perceived income disparity, defined as zero when his income is higher than a neighbor's and the squared payoff difference otherwise, and averaged over all of his neighbors. The correlation between these quantities is 0.345 (P < 0.001) in the no-tips setting and 0.25 (P < 0.001) in the tips setting. These correlations suggest that when players perceive unfairness in their predicament, they are much more likely to engage in conflict with neighbors. On the other hand, the correlation is markedly weaker in the tips setting, providing further evidence for substitution between conflict and tips.
Our interpretation that conflict is an expression of perceived unfairness is also borne out by some of the survey comments. One subject commented that "I could not bear the thought of 1 person making more money [...] I teamed up [with others] to sabotage the player who was not willing to change." Another admitted that "Many times [...] I acted in the following manner: If I am not going to make money, you are not going to make it either." Conflict appears to also serve as a means of tip bargaining. Let C be the time (in seconds) that a player spends in conflict that he both initiates and terminates. Define T as tip income rate, that is, average tip income per minute that a player spends as a Pawn. Let W be the wealth of a player for the entire game. The correlation between C and T is 0.19 (P < 0.001), while the correlation between C and W is −0.51 (P < 0.001). The positive correlation between C and T generalizes across 5 of 7 network architectures (significant in all 5); the only exceptions are Clique Chain and Rewired Chain. Thus, while conflict may show some success in negotiating a higher tip income rate, it yields an unambiguous loss in the long run.
To quantify the tradeoff between time spent in conflict and tip income rate, as well as conflict and wealth, we fit linear regression models to both sets of data pairs. We find (with coefficients having P < 0.001) that every second that a player engages his neighbors in conflict earns him (on average) an additional 0.2 cents in tips. Regressing wealth against conflict, on the other hand, tells us (with even higher significance for both regression coefficients) that every second in conflict costs a player 1.2 cents on average. The struggle for a bigger tip yields meager rewards and ultimately costs a player more than it is worth.
Downward Rigidity of Tips
One explanation of high unemployment offered in macroeconomic theory posits that wages are downwardly rigid, as people view wage decreases as unfair, even if these decreases maintain the real value of wages (e.g., when there is deflation) (Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Akerlof and Shiller 2009) . As a result, employers prefer to offer above-market wages to ensure that worker productivity remains high; what results is a shortage of jobs relative to the number of people seeking work. This story of wage "stickiness" is supported indirectly by data that exhibits considerably less frequent small wage cuts than increases (Akerlof and Shiller 2009) .
In our setting, any tip that is above zero should rationally be viewed as a bonus, with little stigma attached to tip reductions (which are, after all, adjustments towards equilibrium). Nevertheless, we find evidence of downward rigidity in tip changes. For example, we observe many fewer tip cuts than raises: there are a total of 2531 positive and 1797 negative tip changes (a factor of 1.41 more positive changes than negative), with the vast majority of changes in either direction (2245 and 1576 respectively) being only in the minimal 10% increments. That tip changes are downwardly rigid should also be apparent from the Figure 5 . After being quickly established at the 20% level, they are very slow to head toward equilibrium level and never fall even half way back to zero. Figure 8 supports the hypothesis that downward changes are viewed as unfair more directly. The comparisons in the figure are between players who made at least one tip reduction and those who made none. The players who did make a tip reduction suffered more conflict than those who did not, even as average tip income rates were roughly equal between the groups. Additionally, as tip rates increase, tip reductions actually entail more, not less, conflict. To test the significance of this, we looked at finer discretized tip income rate intervals and correlated midpoints of these with average increases in conflict time. The resulting correlation was 0.99 and highly significant (P < 0.001). This result cannot be explained by suggesting that higher tippers also made greater tip reductions: we found no significant correlation between tip pay rate and average size of a tip cut.
Tip reductions are associated with extra profit for players who made the reductions: those that made at least one tip reduction in a game earned, on average, $1.178 in that game, as compared to $1.052 for those who never reduced their tip. A two-sample t-test confirms this difference to be significant (P < 0.001).
Individual Nodes
The previous discussion pertains to the communal patterns of behavior, but there were also interesting variations at the level of individual nodes.
One natural question to ask is whether a node's degree had an impact on its wealth and role choices. We found significant negative correlation between a node's degree and wealth in both settings (correlation of -0.33 in the no-tips setting, -0.26 in the tips setting, both with P < 0.001). Thus, having a high degree was a handicap. Nodes with a high degree also spent considerably less time as King (correlation is -0.37 in the no-tips and -0.4 in the tips settings, both with P < 0.001). Furthermore, the total time spent as King had significant positive correlation with wealth, 0.18 in the no-tips setting and 0.31 in the tips experiments (P < 0.001 in both).
While high degree nodes had a marked disadvantage, they were partially compensated for their handicap when tipping was allowed: the correlation between degree and tip income was 0.27 (P < 0.001); they naturally also dished out significantly less in tips to their neighbors (correlation between degree and tips paid was -0.23 with P < 0.01).
Finally, we found that stability in role choices corresponds to higher pay. The correlation between the number of role changes and wealth was -0.17 in the no-tips and -0.29 in the tips settings (P < 0.001 in both). While conflict was potentially more costly (that is, had higher opportunity cost due to the presence of tip income) in the tips setting, role changes were also more common (an average of 5.9 and 7.4 per game in the no-tips and tips settings respectively). A two-sample t-test finds this difference to be significant (P < 0.02). Interestingly, this increase in activity coincides with a decrease in conflict.
Conclusion
Equilibrium theory is hard-pressed to explain most of our observations, since it predicts that self-interested players will not engage in conflict, and it further predicts no difference in outcome whether tips are available or not.
One of our key observations is that allowing players to exchange tips substantially increases social welfare. Furthermore, we note that although conflict is clearly damaging to all parties, players systematically engage in it, although substantially less when tipping is allowed. We explain the impact of tipping on the amount of conflict between players by noting that tips equalize incomes between network neighbors. When players view their neighbors' income as unfairly higher than theirs, they engage in conflict, perhaps to punish the high earners. Greater equality in wealth therefore reduces the propensity to engage neighbors in conflict.
Since tip exchanges are pure transfers of wealth in our setting, classical economic theory would not anticipate any impact of tips on average profits. It is thus rather remarkable that tipping raises social welfare in our experiments. The positive welfare impact of tipping (and greater equality of wealth distribution) has considerable implications for policy, as it suggests that bridging income inequality may raise social welfare. Alternatively, our findings suggest that when compensation, resources, or tasks are distributed unequally, transfers of money or gifts may go a long way in alleviating interpersonal conflict.
